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What is Austerity?
Rebecca Bramall, Jeremy Gilbert, James Meadway
Abstract This is the edited transcript of a conversation between Rebecca 
Bramall, editor of this special issue, Jeremy Gilbert, editor of New Formations, 
and James Meadway, who at the time was chief economist of the New Economics 
Foundation and is currently advising shadow chancellor of the exchequer 
John McDonnell in a consultancy capacity. The discussion touches on the 
different meanings of ‘austerity’ in contemporary political discourse, the 
history of neoliberal austerity programmes and their political and social effects, 
the uneven implementation of austerity in the UK, and various other issues 
in understanding the cultural, social and economic politics of ‘austerity’ in 
contemporary Britain, today and in the future.
Keywords austerity, post-austerity, neo-keynesian, degrowth, youth
Jeremy: How do we dei ne ‘austerity’? Is there an economic dei nition or is 
it a purely political concept? Or is it a socio-cultural category? What do you 
think, from an economist’s point of view? 
James: In practice it’s political. There’s a hard and fast rule by which to dei ne 
recession – a formula: a recession starts when there’s been two consecutive 
quarters of negative growth. But there isn’t anything similar for austerity – so 
it’s a political category rather than an economic one. And the politics of it is 
particularly important in the UK.
Over the last few years we have had austerity – dei ned not so much by the 
government, because I think, especially initially, they didn’t use the word – but 
by others. When the Coalition Government was created in 2010, very dramatic 
and severe spending cuts were forecast, but even then the word ‘austerity’ was 
not used by advocates of the cuts. Then after a few years of missing dramatic 
targets for spending cuts, for a number of different reasons, the government 
eased up on cuts entirely. For the year running up to the general election 
there were actually no spending cuts applied at all. 
The politics and rhetoric of this process matters a great deal, because 
for some time we actually had less austerity than we were told we were going 
to get; and then in 2014-15, in the year running up to the election, there 
were twelve months of really no new austerity at all. All the while the entire 
rhetoric was stating that austerity was continuing, that the government was 
still implementing cuts, this is all going ahead – which completely disabled 
the Labour opposition at that point. 
1HZ)RUPDWLRQVLQGG 
120     NEW FORMATIONS
Labour were saying a number of different things that didn’t work out: ‘this 
is just going to trash the economy’ and ‘we’re going to oppose the spending 
cuts’ and ‘this is going to lead to everybody having falling living standards’, etc. 
None of these things quite occurred as predicted. So the whole message was 
confused. They were gamed by Chancellor [i nance minister] George Osborne, 
who has his hand on the main lever, after all. If you’re the government of an 
independent country like this, you can determine how much you spend or 
don’t spend, how much you tax or don’t tax at any point in time; so they did, 
and they completely gamed the Labour opposition over that period. So the 
politics of ‘austerity’ and the dei nition of it really matter here, because the 
story counts for more than what you actually do. 
Rebecca: We could try to answer the question by thinking about how austerity 
is dei ned by the groups that have come to oppose it. So within the various 
strands of anti-austerity politics, how has austerity been understood? There are 
some signii cantly different ideas in circulation. A group like UK Uncut has 
a particular implicit conception of what austerity is; anti-austerity movements 
across Europe have arguably differing conceptions of it. Sometimes it is about 
being against the political structures that are imposing austerity – the EU, the 
Troika. Sometimes it’s about cuts to public services or privatization. In the case 
of the most prominent UK Uncut campaigns, there has been a focus on the 
relationship between corporate tax avoidance and cuts in public spending. 
Arguably, this actually isn’t an anti-austerity position at all. It doesn’t challenge 
the idea that you need to deal with the dei cit; rather it’s about pointing to 
an alternative way of eliminating it. So within these different movements, 
distinctive conceptions of what activists need to challenge and to work against 
produce very l uid meanings of austerity.
James: There is some consistency to what the term means though. Basically 
what everyone means by ‘austerity’ is quite severe spending cuts of one sort or 
another. At the UK general election in May 2015, the three main political parties 
– Labour, Liberal Democrats and Conservatives – took differing approaches to 
the question of how to balance spending cuts and tax rises. The emphasis for 
the Conservatives is very much on spending cuts rather than tax rises. All of 
them however, accepted the basic premise that the government dei cit was bad 
and must be closed, which is, economically speaking, extremely questionable. 
Rebecca: Well again, there’s another strand of anti-austerity politics which is 
about questioning the ‘we must start living within our means’ commonsense. 
That’s another distinct anti-austerity argument. And again, austerity means 
something different in the context of that argument. So although there might 
be a boiled-down economic dei nition, we’ve got different ideas about austerity 
l oating around. And maybe that’s one of the reasons why anti-austerity politics 
hasn’t been very successful.
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ANTI-AUSTERITIES 
Jeremy: I think that’s a good point. Within anti-austerity discourse there’s at 
least two main frames aren’t there? There’s an essentially neo-Keynesian frame 
according to which all this kind of monetary nonsense about having to balance 
the books is just economically illiterate. Then there’s the position which asserts 
that the books must be balanced, but the main burden of achieving that end 
must fall on the rich. I mean even Corbyn isn’t publicly saying ‘all this talk 
about eliminating the dei cit is just stupid’.
Rebecca: And that’s interesting because Corbyn’s draft economic plan draws 
heavily on the work of Richard Murphy, who’s a leading tax researcher. So 
Corbyn appears to be invested in the idea that we should go after tax avoiders, 
and that will be how we will deal with the dei cit.
James: I think Murphy would be inclined towards the view that the dei cit isn’t 
that big an issue, and that in practice the government dei cit is what keeps the 
rest of the economy moving.
But I think there are weaknesses with the idea that tackling tax avoidance 
alone can be central to a radical economic programme and with anti-austerity 
politics in general. One, is that it sometimes lines up with a kind of elite anti-
austerity economics which is extremely limited in the ways that it challenges the 
underlying assumptions of neoliberalism and austerity politics. For example, 
consider Paul Krugman, who is a very good economist (with a very good blog). He 
is very reputable and really well-respected almost across the political spectrum. 
He takes a neo-Keynesian position: straight down the line, if you’re in recession 
don’t make cuts, as you’ll make the economy weaker. Krugman isn’t really on 
the left, and has argued according to the same logic that when the economy is 
growing then that’s when you start to begin to cut. This is a sort of right-wing 
Keynesian, technocratic version of anti-austerity economics which I don’t think 
has often been helpful in giving expression to the more general, innate feeling 
shared by many people – which UK Uncut tapped into – that something is 
wrong with Amazon not paying any tax. This argument is easier for people to 
understand than technical economic arguments about monetary policy. 
But these two sets of arguments and observations don’t necessarily i t 
together very well and it’s trying to tease out something between the two so that 
you get somewhere politically which has proved very difi cult in practice. Then 
there’s also weaknesses with the general idea that going after tax evasion can 
have great effects. It can have some, but tackling avoidance is itself a challenge. 
It’s just difi cult. I mean Richard Murphy has estimated the tax gap at 120 
billion pounds. As he has said, it will be very, very difi cult (to be generous!) 
to get most of that money because by the nature of tax avoidance people who 
are avoiding tax are very good at not paying taxes. If the government just says 
to them ‘Here you must pay this tax’, they’ll i nd some other way to not pay 
the tax.
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ECOLOGY AND DEGROWTH
Rebecca: Another kind of anti-austerity position that we might discuss is the 
one that emerges out of the ‘degrowth’ hypothesis. This position offers a 
critique of austerity, but it is also critical of anti-austerity politics. So to be 
more specii c, political ecologists based at the Autonomous University in 
Barcelona, notably Giorgos Kallis, are critical of austerity, but they’re also 
critical of what they call the ‘austerity stimulus’ paradigm, or the idea that we 
would even want to ‘get back to growth’. At the same time they’re treading a 
i ne line, because they don’t want degrowth to be confused with recession. In 
fact they’ve put a considerable amount of energy into trying to differentiate 
degrowth and recession.
I’ve been interested in the relationship between concepts of austerity and 
environmental politics for a while. In my book there’s a discussion of the 
considerable consonance between the rhetorics that were being used in the 
mid-2000s to talk about ‘environmental war economies’ [i.e. the idea that 
a pro-environmental programme might involve the mobilisation of society 
against environmental degradation and its consequences on a scale and with 
a level of co-ordination comparable to the mobilisation of a population during 
a full-scale war], and so on, and austerity politics. Those resonances have 
become more muted, but they have nonetheless created an overlap between 
the language and implications of these different economic perspectives. It 
poses quite a big problem for environmental politics now, I think. In the wake 
of austerity, how do you talk about the idea that ‘less is more’? I’d be interested 
in what you think about that.
James: I think you’ve picked up on a key issue there. I mean it’s always struck 
me as slightly difi cult to say at one and the same time that we should reduce 
growth to protect the environment and that all we have to do is to print more 
money and use it wisely and all will be well. So these two approaches do not 
i t easily together, unless you start being really quite prescriptive about how 
the money is spent and managed. And there is a kind of pro-austerity position 
implicit in some versions of degrowth rhetoric.
I used to get emails from people saying ‘Why are you arguing that the 
government should spend money? It’s good that we have this recession, it’s 
good that we have austerity – it means everyone has to spend less and therefore 
damage the environment less’. The last recession was one of the few occasions 
when carbon dioxide emissions actually dropped – in the depth of recession, 
for the UK and for Western Europe as a whole. There is an immediate impact 
because people spend less and they travel less and there you go: lower carbon 
emissions. So you can see why that case is being made. This i ts with a long 
Malthusian tradition within the environmental movement, going all the way 
back to Malthus I suppose, which informs the rhetoric you get around some 
interpretations of the ‘limits to growth’ literature and the idea that there 
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are planetary boundaries which must be respected. The distributional issues 
associated with that are secondary, from the perspective of this Malthusian 
tradition.
Now, the difi culty here is that it is the question of distribution that gives you 
the boundaries. There was a particularly interesting argument at the European 
Society for Ecological Economics conference in Leeds recently between the 
degrowth people – Kallis in particular – on one side and the sort of more 
longer standing ‘steady state economy’ people; and an argument about what 
you mean by limits and what you mean by plenty.
The degrowth argument is that these limits are not actually physical, if 
you’re talking about limits for what we do as a society. They are not physical 
in the literal sense: rather they are dei ned by how society is organised. So if 
you change the organisation of society and re-dei ne limits, then you re-dei ne 
what you mean by plenty. 
Rebecca: That’s why the degrowth economists are very interested in the concept 
of ‘dépense sociale’ [lit: social expenditure], isn’t it? This is the idea that you 
actually can and perhaps should consume in a wasteful way, but it has to be 
done according to a democratically agreed process.
James: I thought this was one of the more brilliant things that Kallis said: that 
society always produces, so the issue for the environment is not about saving 
anything: rather, it’s the question of the surplus that society produces. What do 
you do with the surplus? Which is fundamental in the end to any decent political 
economy. This is Marx. This is Riccardo. This is classical political economy. What 
do you do with the surplus? The whole of Marxist thought arguably starts with 
the question: once you have class societies what do you do with the surplus? 
How do you organise it? And of course we can destroy it – what we could do, 
for example is just burn it in a massive social festival. According to this line 
of thinking, that would be a good thing to do with the surplus. Whereas what 
we actually do with the surplus today is to frantically reinvest it in increasingly 
useless, environmentally destructive ways; and that’s what creates the problems 
with growth.
Rebecca: And as I understand it, the idea of austerity, or sobriety, or whatever 
they want to call it, applies on more individual basis; you are supposed to live 
a more sober, austere kind of life in this post-growth context, while ‘waste’ 
takes place in a social setting, through the ritual destruction of accumulated 
surplus. Personal sobriety and socialized dépense are meant to replace the 
pairing of social austerity and individual excess that we’re more familiar with. 
So again, there’s an idea of austerity there, and it’s being worked through how 
they develop and make the case for degrowth.
James: This is very interesting stuff, putting a much more constructivist spin 
on the usual ‘limits to growth’ and ‘planetary boundaries’ ideas, which tends 
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towards being a little bit mechanical. At some point, all the oil will run out: 
that is true. But before we get to that point, fairly dramatic things are going 
to happen to human society. So it is not quite as easy as going, ‘Right that is it, 
everything is going to be different’. You can see with the peak oil arguments 
you get; ‘Well the oil is running out, therefore the price will just go up and 
up and up forever, and that will change everything’. But it’s never that simple. 
Rebecca: Andrew Ross makes a similar argument in his book The Chicago 
Gangster Theory of Life when he talks about the austerity policies that emerged 
out of New York in the mid-1970s. He’s critical of the idea that we already know 
what the parameters of scarcity are – that we should accept scarcity as a ‘default 
condition’ – and he argues that there’s an interplay between environmentalism 
and neoliberal austerity economics.
James: You can see it again with the 1945 Labour government. Although in 
retrospect it seems wonderful, you had Stafford Cripps as Chancellor who 
shifted rapidly to right, after being expelled from the Labour Party for being 
too left wing in the ‘30s. And he had this narrative that they were going to 
implement austerity, although they were going to try to do it fairly, and it would 
all be much more re-distributive and reasonable than it is now. That is another 
version of austerity politics, which we can see a current example of in the 
case of Hollande in France. His programme has basically been to do austerity 
nicely, claiming to make sure that the rich really bear the consequences and 
everybody else won’t suffer. And in Greece, after his difi cult nine months in 
government, and the splits in Syriza and the rest of it, Tsipras’ line appears to 
be also ‘We’ll do austerity nicely’: so it’s austerity with a human face. 
And that does get us back to the UK Uncut stuff I think. Implicit in that is a 
sort of idea that ‘well we’re gonna, you know, we’ll i nd someone else who can be 
made to fund the dei cit’ – which does have a kind of popular appeal. It is easy, to 
say: ‘these people have loads of money …we need to cover this gap. Off you go’.
EXPERIENCING AUSTERITY
Rebecca: Well this gets to the root of the problem that lots of people have 
talked about, which is the anti-democratic nature of imposed austerity – 
whether it is being imposed by the Troika, or whether it is being imposed by 
the Coalition or by the Conservative government: the question is whether we, 
the public, agreed to this. What is the democratic process through which we 
make economic decisions? Austerity might be a perfectly reasonable way of 
dealing with certain kinds of problems, so long as everyone participates in the 
decision about what it is that you are going to cut or pull back on. 
James: Yes this is the real challenge. There is a more general fact that 
neoliberalism has issues with democracy, full stop. But there’s a particular 
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problem with austerity in Greece for example in that the vast majority of Greeks 
do not want it to happen, but it’s being imposed on them anyway, which is 
an obvious democratic issue. It’s more subtle in the UK. This comes back to 
the fact that we didn’t get the austerity that we were promised, or told that we 
would get. We got something that was a much softer version of that. And the 
rhetoric from this government before the 2015 general election has not been 
‘this will hurt’ – it’s been all about the broad sunlit uplands and the fact that 
things are going to get better. 
Now the projections of what austerity cuts are going to mean during this 
parliament, in particular with regard to changes to social benei ts, especially 
Working Tax Credits [a welfare benei t for low-paid workers], are quite 
serious. Over the next few years most people who are receiving it are going to 
lose at least some money, and a good three million people are going to lose 
a thousand pounds a year. And those three million people are all down the 
bottom end of the income distribution. Now, that is something we have not 
been told about – we were told that actually this is going to be okay, really, that 
there are going to be efi ciency savings to cover the cuts and that in any case 
these people are all spongers and it is not like this is going to hit everybody. 
[NB: this policy was dropped following public outcries and stiff opposition 
from the Labour leadership]
Rebecca: So then I think this comes back to our original question about the 
nature of austerity. What is more signii cant, the threat that your standard 
of living is going to be curtailed, or the experience of feeling the effects of 
austerity? I think it is really interesting, in relation to what you are talking about, 
James, to consider the relationship between being told that austerity is going to 
be coming, and austerity’s felt impacts – austerity ‘actually’ happening to you.
One of the polls that has been thought-provoking (in so far as we want 
to pay attention to polls at all) is the YouGov survey on public opinion on 
the spending cuts, which has been running since 2010. They’ve been asking 
whether participants feel that spending cuts are, or are not, having an impact 
on their own lives. And the number giving a positive response to that question 
has been decreasing. So in 2011, 70% of people said that the spending cuts 
were impacting them, but by May 2015 it was only 45%. In part this has to do 
with the clever way in which austerity has been implemented, the way it has 
been targeted at vulnerable and isolated social groups. But I think it is also 
something to do with the temporality of its implementation, which has perhaps 
encouraged people to reconcile themselves to the inevitable. 
In such a situation, what does feeling that spending cuts are ‘having an 
impact’ really mean? Actually it might be something that you experience as 
embodied: rather in the way that Rebecca Coleman describes in her piece 
in this issue, when she talks about the experience of anticipation and the 
reorganisation of your expectations about your entitlements around that 
anticipation of what is to come. So when it does come, the impact of austerity 
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is in a way somewhat softened. That would be one of my interpretations of 
what is happening, which I think has serious implications for an ‘anti-austerity’ 
politics: is there any use in positioning a politics against a scenario that people 
have already taken on board and internalised? Can we expect people to get 
worked up about something that is still evidently happening to them, but that 
they don’t really ‘feel’ – they don’t construe as ‘having an impact’?
James: Yes. It’s like the idea that if you put a frog in boiling water it jumps 
out straight away, but if you turn the heat up gradually it doesn’t notice until 
it’s too late (apparently frogs don’t really do this, but it’s a good metaphor).
But where I think the austerity project is going to come a cropper is at 
the point where all the low-hanging fruit has already been harvested. Initially 
they’ve gone for things that are politically easy to cut, often because they can 
pass on responsibility for implementing the cuts to local municipalities. The 
biggest chunk of cuts over the last i ve years has been to central government 
funding for local government, and central government has largely just 
handed the cuts to local council and told them to deal with it. And local 
authorities have actually done a surprisingly good job in many ways in 
coping with this. Although in many cases they have warded off disaster by 
implementing some very weird funding arrangements, which are storing up 
all sorts of issues for further down the line. But having got this far, having 
hacked away at the stuff they can get at relatively easily, the government 
are now having to hit even some of the core Conservative voters. The Tax 
Credits changes are going to be huge. The only way they are going to get 
through them, I suspect, without a serious upset of one form or another, is 
if the economy carries on growing.
Why is the economy growing at the moment, despite austerity? It’s partly 
because austerity has not been implemented to the extent that was threatened, 
and also because the property market and borrowing levels are rising rapidly – 
not as badly as in 2006 and 2007, but faster than is likely to be stable. If you are 
in a position where you can kind of gloss over whatever difi culties there may be 
with extra borrowing, it is not a sustainable position in the long-run, but it can 
make everything look more comfortable, and your general situation does not 
seem too bad. This is the current situation for a lot of middle income voters.
The difi culty comes when you cannot meet the repayments, or when you 
cannot get extra money or you cannot roll over your loans. Which again, is 
something that can happen: sooner, rather than later, for a lot of people. I 
mean, that is the real issue which we are talking about here: concentration 
of debt. It is striking the way in which, since 2008 the period of austerity has 
been one in which the richer chunk of the population, say the top twenty per 
cent have been paying down debt. And the poorer chunk, around the bottom 
twenty per cent have been taking on more and more debt: kind of regressive 
redistribution of debt. This is distinct from the situation pre-2008: before 
2008 everybody is taking on more debt – after 2008 it works in this new way. 
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THE POLITICS OF DEBT
Rebecca: We might talk about that a bit more. There are a couple of articles 
in the issue about the politics of debt and the idea of organising politically 
around debt and indebtedness. We can contrast the situation in the UK with 
that in the US, where there has been a bit more take up of that idea, and where 
an anti-austerity politics has mutated into more of a debt-resistance politics. 
Such developments have been quite limited here so far I think. Liam Stanley, 
Joe Deville and Johnna Montgomerie’s article in this issue looks at the very 
low-level support mechanisms that exist on peer-to-peer platforms, where 
people can offer debt advice to each other. It is debatable whether we want to 
see that kind of activity as a form of resistance. And then there is the question 
of students and student-debt and how that is going to play out. 
Jeremy: Well there is a very weak tradition in this country, of organising around 
issues like debt. A certain tradition of economic moralism is very strong here, 
and is arguably a central strand of the English liberal tradition. That doesn’t 
create very conducive territory for debt to become a basis for organisation. 
Of course we can still hope for that, but I think this partly explains why it has 
been relatively easy for them to continue rolling out these huge levels of debt.
It is worth thinking a bit about the kind of predictions that were being 
made in 2008 about the scale of austerity and the likely social and political 
consequences of the crisis were. There was a very wide-spread belief that 
we were dei nitely about to see serious levels of mass unemployment, and I 
think that that expectation was one of the conditions for people accepting a 
signii cant cut in wages, across the board, effectively. Which of course is always 
what capital wants: this is basic Marxism, page 1, what capital always wants is to 
reduce wages. And it did it very effectively by threatening that things otherwise 
things were going to be much, much worse. I think in England, in particular 
– less so in Scotland and Wales than in England – we have a culturally and 
historically quite conducive kind of context for that, because of the kind of 
strength of liberal economic moralism, and liberal individualism, which does 
mean that people are willing to accept the idea both that capital has a right 
to pursue proi tability and that debt is a personal responsibility. 
So I am not saying that debt shouldn’t be mobilised around. But I am 
not that optimistic personally, about it becoming a basis for mobilisation in 
this country. I think we would have been on much stronger ground actually 
just trying to publicise the issue of the generalised wage-cut which so many 
people suffered and which barely got discussed at all in the wider media. It 
would have been, and still would be, a major political achievement just to get 
back into public discourse the fact that wages have suffered this serious cut 
across the board.
James: Particularly if you are young.
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Jeremy: Well exactly. 
YOUTH AND NEOLIBERALISM 
James: For people below the age of thirty or so this has been disastrous: they’ve 
suffered a cut of ten per cent or more in real wages over the last few years. 
Jeremy: The youth issue is very interesting. I have always been a rather 
pessimistic about the likelihood of mass youth mobilization. In 2008 I didn’t 
think there was going to be a revolution, and I thought the establishment 
were going to ride this out quite successfully. But I increasingly think now 
that eventually there must come a limit to how far youth can bear the brunt 
of the whole neoliberal project. Now that doesn’t begin in 2008 – in fact it 
begins right at the start of that project, in the mid-1970s. I think punk was 
basically a response to the i rst wave of realisation that the expansion of social 
entitlements for young people which characterised the post-war period – 
more spending power, more personal freedom, more cultural autonomy, an 
expansive welfare state, assistance in setting up homes – was coming to an end 
and going into reverse.
James: I don’t know about that – those people all got houses. I think the 
decisive tipping point comes around 2004. That is when home ownership 
actually starts to drop off. 
Jeremy: That is true, but that is the outcome of a process which begins with 
the return of mass unemployment, the beginnings of benei t cuts, the end 
of the 1960s expansion of the universities. That all begins in the mid-1970s.
James: But universities expand again.
Jeremy: They do expand, they do expand again but they expand on quite 
different terms.
The experience that is offered to students in those parts of the university 
sector which expanded from the early 1990s on has never been remotely 
comparable to that which the middle classes think of as a ‘traditional’ university 
experience. Most of those students have had to work during term time and 
have never had the classic experience of full-time study, for example. 
Rebecca: It’s a question of different layers of entitlement, isn’t it? It’s not that 
there is a dei nite moment when everything changes – these entitlements are 
just whittled away.
James: Boiling frogs again I suppose, isn’t it? So each stage does not seem 
too bad, so you tolerate it. I mean there does seem to be a break I think, in 
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2008. The experience of anybody graduating since 2008, and not even if you 
were graduating, just if you were young, has been dramatically different to the 
experience before that point. For people in that age bracket, it has become a 
social reality that they will never own a house, despite this still being held up 
as the key marker of successful economic independence.
Jeremy: Well a lot of people I graduated with in 1993 do not own houses. I 
think the tipping point was as much about the fact that after 2008 even people 
who have been to elite universities and write for newspapers i nd it difi cult to 
buy homes, at least in London. That’s why we suddenly start hearing about this 
as if it’s some kind of new phenomenon. But a lot of the people I graduated 
with from a former polytechnic in the early Nineties, who had to leave London 
and couldn’t afford houses then, still don’t have houses. 
James: This is quite a critical issue actually. I do not want to be l ippant 
about it, because I think you are right that it is when these changes start to 
affect sections of the public who have always assumed that they are going to 
achieve that particular kind of middle-class lifestyle that a certain political 
tipping-point is reached. It strikes me that British capitalism has been quite 
bad at generating a middle class for quite a long period of time now, which 
is a major problem for it, but that problem only becomes fully apparent from 
2004 or 2008.
Jeremy: Yes I think that’s true.
James: Because in practice it has been a key role of the state to create a middle 
class, which has a crucial stabilising function. And every government does it. 
Even under Thatcher, publicly funded employment-creation is incredible. 
She created at least a million or so publicly funded posts, either in the public 
sector or publicly-funded jobs own the private sector, despite ‘rolling back the 
frontiers of the state’. Every government basically creates more and more jobs 
like this, until you get to this one, and suddenly that stops. And then: where 
is the selection of jobs in the private sector that might offer elite graduates 
that nice middle-class lifestyle? If you have been to, you know, one of the elite 
universities, let us say. Now that looks like illustrating the truth of a standard 
working marxist assumption: that without a middle class of some sort, capitalism 
looks very unstable.
Jeremy: Yes I think that is true. I’m not trying to deny it at all. I wasn’t trying 
to deny at all there is some kind of political tipping point reached around the 
mid two-thousands. But it is an important point that right from the beginning 
of the kind of monetary cuts of the mid-to-late Seventies, youth have always 
been a particular target for wage cuts and service cuts. It is a consistent 
feature of neoliberalism that wages, entitlements, services and training for 
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youth, have been a target. They were a target from very early on. There was 
a massive wave of cuts in the late 1980s when 16 – 18 year olds had almost 
all benei t entitlement withdrawn and when students had almost all such 
entitlements withdrawn. What we are describing now then is the limit point, 
at which now even the most privileged youth are under attack. Which means 
there is almost no-one left for them to attack amongst the young, who even 
amongst the traditional privileged middle classes, have now lost almost all of 
their established privileges. 
To me that is the best explanation available of what is going on around 
Corbyn, for example. I would say that the long neoliberal project in Britain, 
at least, has been predicated as much as on anything, on the assumption that 
youth will remain politically inert, and politically inactive and disaggregated, 
and that the ones who were politically mobilised, were concentrated in the 
Labour cities anyway, and by the time they were old enough to be more likely 
to vote, would be would be comfortably re-settled in suburban homes. But 
that’s a process which inherently just cannot go on forever
James: It’s probably not been true for the past decade that the youth could be 
counted on to remain quiet in that way. I mean there have been a serious of 
basically useful mobilisations of one sort or another, since, at least the early 
2000s I suppose. The other issue with Corbyn is that his election as Labour 
leader (he is sixty-six and many of his supporters are under thirty) represented 
a sort of generation gap in terms of political representation. 
Jeremy: Yes exactly. 
James: For anyone of the Left who reaches adulthood around the mid-1990s, 
there is just no obvious home for you. The Labour party is dominated by New 
Labour, by people who basically tell you: ‘You are an appalling impediment 
to everything we want to do. Shut up and keep out of the way’. This goes on 
for nearly twenty years. Then suddenly the situation kind of bursts open, and 
everyone comes rushing back out. Some of it is the youth, some of it is actually 
older people going back to the Labour party all of a sudden. 
Jeremy: Yeah, and I think that is true. Nobody has got a demographic 
breakdown of who they, of who Corbyn’s supporters are. But I think, that is 
true. It is clearly not just a youth phenomenon.
James: According to YouGov the sample of people supporting it tends to be 
younger and tends to be somewhat more working class than support for the 
other candidates. But that is a set of people, within the Labour Party, rather 
than a set of people, in general.
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NEOLIBERALISM AFTER 2008: A SIGNIFICANT NEW PHASE?
James: There’s another way in which 2008 seems to represent a signii cant 
political break. It was widely expected that a country like Britain, experiencing 
a shock on the scale of 2008, would suddenly see unemployment rising to 
mass levels. Unemployment did increase, but clearly not on anything like the 
scale that was predicted on the basis of the previous recession, including that 
of the 1990s. This really looks like an important break with past experience. 
Michal Kalecki’s classic paper on the politics of unemployment, from the 
1940s, says that full employment is always a problem for capitalism, because if 
you get rid of unemployment then workers become organised, become more 
coni dent and push for higher wages. This pretty well describes the economics 
and politics of the post-war boom: low unemployment, very well-organised 
groups of workers able to push for very high wages. That happens, then it is 
all broken up when unemployment returns in the 70s and 80s. What seems to 
be happening now is a break with Kalecki’s pattern: unemployment is falling, 
but so are wages and workplace organisation is getting weaker and weaker. I 
think this does look quite unprecedented.
Now whether it will hold, or whether some new form of organisation will 
turn up, is not clear. Private sector unionisation has been rising very slightly 
for the last three or four years now, which is a huge break with the last thirty 
years. But whether that turns into anything happening in terms of employment 
or whether we just carry on with this process until it is completely an atomised 
labour force, is not really very clear at this point. 
Jeremy: Very interesting point. The obvious explanation for all this of course 
is that the technical and social reorganisation of capitalism since the 1970s 
has broken up all the traditional modes of organisation. Arguably this is 
what enables capital to tolerate full employment, or much higher levels of 
employment. Whereas under Fordism in particular, it couldn’t politically 
tolerate either high levels of unemployment or full employment for very 
long: full employment led to labour militancy while unemployment led to 
catastrophically low levels of aggregate demand. 
Which brings us back to the issue of debt, I think. Whereas full employment 
and rising wages were the main means of sustaining demand in the post-war 
period, since the 1970s we’ve seen a shift to consumption being supported 
largely through debt. I always tell my students that I remember when a credit 
card was a new thing: I remember my Mum getting her i rst Access Card, and 
me being fascinated by this strange object. They really can’t believe it – it’s like 
telling them I remember the i rst telephone or something like that. They can 
barely imagine that there was ever a moment before high levels of personal 
debt were a normal element of the consumer economy. 
In fact I would say that the expansion of personal debt has been the answer 
to the problem, which capitalists faced, really not just since the war, but since 
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the 1920s: how do you continue to expand consumption, without pushing your 
wage bill past the level which makes proi tability sustainable? 
James: Well there are at least two answers, possibly, to that, both of which 
probably do indeed depend ultimately on debt. One of them is the answer 
we have here and the US, which is: cut wages, deal with the fact that no-one 
has any money to buy the stuff that we are trying to sell to them by extending 
credit to them, thereby keep the whole thing ticking over. That is basically 
how neoliberalism works in the US and the UK. 
Germany has adopted quite a different solution: you maintain much, much 
lower levels of personal debt, but instead you look for a market elsewhere to 
sell your exports to generate income. So you cut wages and then sell cheap 
stuff to the rest of the world (comparatively cheap stuff). 
Jeremy: And that’s why the property market’s so much less important in 
Germany than here. And to avoid that centrality of property speculation and 
debt to the growth model, you need a big export drive.
James: Yes: you i nd a market somewhere, right?
James: And of course if you are trying to export to someone else that implies 
debt being created somewhere else, in the country that you are exporting to. 
If you have a surplus country you are exporting much more than you import; 
it has to be the case that someone, somewhere else is importing much more 
than they export. So there has to be a dei cit country. So ultimately you are 
still relying on debt creation. And that is what leads to the Greek crisis. 
Jeremy: And I guess in the British context we see the emergence of austerity as 
a sort of structure of feeling: a kind of mood, and affective assemblage, rather 
than as a coherent narrative that stands up to any kind of logical scrutiny. And 
this is really a tool for managing the increasingly difi cult contradictions in 
that situation, isn’t it?
James: Yes.
Jeremy: The levels of debt are not sustainable and they cannot sustain the levels 
of consumption that they did before 2008. You have really got to persuade 
people that the level of consumption that they have come to expect before 
2008 just is not going to be there for everybody. In the same way. Or at least 
it is going to have to be contracted for a sustained period of time. Maybe 
the situation is more complicated than wages, spending and consumption 
having permanently contracted, given that wages and consumption levels are 
rising again, as is debt. Perhaps it’s merely the case that government has been 
claiming the right to initiate periods of contraction – a right it has not tried to 
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exercise since the late 1970s /early 1980s and the major wave of monetarist-
inspired cuts, or the period of high interest rates in the late 1980s at the latest. 
It seems to me, at least in places like Britain and the States, neoliberal 
governments have been quite conscious of the lack of popular legitimacy for 
the neoliberal project since the late 1980s, the fact that its core elements – 
privatisation, endless tax cuts for the rich – were never that popular, which 
meant that any sustained contraction of people’s capacity to consume 
would mean that they would quickly transfer support to some kind of social 
democratic alternative. So the reclamation by government of the right to 
reduce people’s power to consume for sustained periods seems like perhaps 
another signii cant recent change.
James: Well it partly depends on where consumption appears. One thing that 
all governments do is to try and shift the balance around between household 
primary consumption and public spending, but given the weakness of the 
underlying economy since 2008, you just end up with an awful lot of debt 
creation, one way or the other, whichever way you go. The dei cit is still 
very large and is still adding to the government debt pile, and we now have 
household borrowing going up again, which is adding to the overall debt pile. 
So all of it is just stacking up to recreate conditions that produced the 2008 crisis 
in the i rst place, but in the context of a fundamentally weaker economy, with 
much lower productivity growth and much higher levels of debt in general. I 
mean the real challenge will be if we hit another crisis, at any point soon: the 
capacity to deal with this will be very, very limited indeed. 
Jeremy: Yes and it is very hard to see how the current situation is sustainable. I 
remember I was a bit more sceptical when you said to me, a couple of months 
ago, that a further economic crisis was inevitable in the next i ve years. But now 
it seems seem very difi cult to see how this is going to be avoidable. 
THE POLITICS OF ‘CRISIS’ 
Rebecca: So is it possible that if there were another i nancial crisis, then ‘anti-
austerity’ politics might become more meaningful again? More comprehensible 
to an ordinary person?
James: There are two issues here. One is the slightly peculiar fact that public 
opinion seems to be sort of anti-Keynesian – so, when the economy is shrinking, 
government spending must be cut as well, which is not what your Keynesian 
economic management tells you to do (quite the opposite). Now the economy 
is growing again, it would seem that a lot of the support for austerity is dropping 
off. So it is possible that the response to another shock, will be to say ‘Oh no 
– it’s terrible! We have to cut everything again’. But my guess, on the other 
hand, is that under such circumstances sensible economic management will 
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prevail. If we hit a major shock and a recession, any hope of austerity will go 
out of the window. And the Government will do what it did in 2008: open 
the taps, borrow like crazy and attempt to set a l oor to the collapse that we 
would otherwise be looking at. And at that point we would be moving from a 
manageable level of public debt to one that starts to look really quite signii cant, 
if the shock is on anything like the scale of 2008 again. 
So in practice politically the Left would probably want to be much more 
populist about this. We should have a discourse available which states, basically 
that they (the i nancial elites and the government which is beholden to them) 
have driven us into the wall again. It would state clearly that the situation is not 
our fault because we have all been practicing austerity for several years already, 
that we have done that and it didn’t work and was never going to work, and so this 
is what we should be doing instead, rather than trying to argue about economic 
management, or whatever. At that point, it becomes a question of politics. 
Jeremy: By contrast, there wasn’t a readily-available, publicly circulated, 
anti-austerity narrative after 2008. Because the Labour leadership remained 
committed, broadly speaking, to that kind of anti-Keynesian agenda. 
James: I think the situation was more complicated than that. The Left was 
completely blind-sided in general by three things: 
One, it didn’t really understand the crisis. We didn’t really understand its 
nature as a debt crisis. There was actually too much emphasis on the idea of 
the inherently crisis-ridden nature of capitalism as such and not enough on 
the specii city of the situation. 
Secondly, we didn’t really understand what was happening with the bailouts. 
It took a while for a section of the Left to grasp the fact that this was not some 
welcome return to Labour’s glorious socialist past by nationalising the banks, 
but that it made sense to the people in charge. 
The third one was the government’s own adoption of a kind of Keynesianism. 
They just spent and spent from 2008 to sometime in 2010.
Rebecca: And that was to do with Greece wasn’t it? It had to do with a growing 
sense of alarm about what was happening in Greece and the idea that that level 
of social breakdown was inevitable if the government carried on spending, 
allowing the dei cit to the rise to the point where it lost its credit rating. 
James: Yes that was the rhetoric. What was extraordinary was the shift from 
the Conservative leadership saying ‘we will support Labour spending plans’, 
as they did all the way through until at least summer 2008, to them beginning 
to claim, within weeks of the crisis erupting, that this was primarily a crisis of 
government spending. This was a demonstrably nonsensical account of the 
crisis, but they stuck to it for years and years and years and years until people 
began to believe it. They have not deviated from this narrative at all. 
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That certainly helped prepare the ground, because the only people out 
there with a clear message, at this point were these people. What were the 
Left supposed to do? I mean, what are we supposed to do with New Labour 
carrying out a policy which seemed to be simultaneously doing something that 
the Left did want – a sort of Keynesianism response – and at the same time 
something that we didn’t want – shoring up the bankers. Next time I hope 
that there is a bit more clarity about this from the Left, because there really 
wasn’t at the time. 
Jeremy: It’s worth explaining the history for people who might are reading this 
in other countries. In the initial stages of the crisis the situation was pretty much 
exactly the same as that situation in the US: there was a crisis of capitalisation 
of the major banks, which was threatening to sink the entire i nancial system. 
Pretty much the same policy programme was enacted by Gordon Brown, in the 
dying days of his administration, as the Obama administration implemented. 
But in the space of two years after that the Right in Britain successfully 
created a narrative according to which the entire crisis, and then its on-going 
consequences, were somehow an effect of government overspending. It is as 
if the Right in America had managed to convince everybody that Obamacare 
is basically the reason for the crisis: which is just kind of extraordinary when 
you think about it. It does say something about the tactical incompetence of 
the Left leadership in Britain, that the Right managed to get away with that, 
because it is just an absurd argument.
James: But they believed what they were saying. You know, when Gordon Brown 
was saying, in the days before the crisis, ‘No return to boom and bust’. He 
believed this, and all of his economists and advisors were saying: ‘Yes, there 
will really be no return to boom or bust’. So when the crisis happened, they 
reacted, in some ways with impressive speed, to changed circumstances. It 
was quite dramatic how quickly they responded, and the British system was 
pretty much the i rst to get on top of this. Anyhow, they had had a bit of a test 
run with the crisis at Northern Rock (a British bank that was bailed out from 
insolvency) the previous year. But they were very, very rapid about getting on 
top of things. It is just that this represents such a break with everything they 
have said before and everything they had known: ‘No return to boom and bust, 
everything will be i ne’; the opposition notionally agreed with their spending 
plans; what could possibly go wrong?
POST-AUSTERITY POLITICS
Rebecca: It’s been argued that austerity creates opportunities for certain kinds 
of social actors, and particularly for those who have begun to i ll that space 
left by the rolling back of the state. Anti-austerity protestors have moved to 
defend the remnants of the post-war settlement – protesting against the closure 
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of public libraries, hospitals or children’s facilities. However there are also 
examples of social actors who have used austerity as an opportunity to identify 
what they think was wrong with that welfare state system, and to explore new 
ways to organise public services, potentially involving communities in the co-
production of services, for example.
Kirsten Forkert is very critical of this turn in her article in this issue; she 
talks about it in terms of a ‘creativity’ agenda – a way of persuading people that 
austerity offers opportunities to be more ‘creative’ with the delivery of public 
services. As Kirsten argues, there’s a real risk that these social actors become 
complicit with the imposition of austerity. From a similar perspective, Emma 
Dowling and David Harvie have been critical of the use of tools like social 
impacts bonds in this terrain, which they see as enabling social reproduction 
to be harnessed for proi t.
So, I think that is an interesting area to talk about. Because it gets at 
something which I have always been interested in, which is that there are a lot 
of appealing things about austerity – in so far as it is constructed as a cultural 
phenomenon or a kind of atmosphere which is apparently conducive to the 
idea of communities coming together and having more involvement in the 
delivery of local services, for example. That’s an idea that has a natural i t with 
Cameron’s early ‘Big Society’ agenda [a project to shift social provision from 
the state to the voluntary sectors]. But to what extent might it be possible 
to incorporate these desires, this structure of feeling, into an anti-austerity 
politics? 
Jeremy: I gave a conference paper in 2008 called ‘Can a crisis be good for 
you?’. It was about this general sense that a sort of receptivity to austerity among 
quite a large public was partly predicated on this shared sense of the excessive 
levels of consumption and debt that were characterising advanced neoliberal 
culture; as if everybody knew it wasn’t sustainable on some level; there was a 
sort of collective unconscious that knew, one way or another, that this growth 
model was not working, really, and was not sustainable.
Rebecca: Ruth Levitas wrote a good piece about this, a few years ago. She 
suggested that people might be ready to embrace post-material values, and 
about the importance of imagining an alternative, utopian version of the Big 
Society, which would precisely capture those desires and take them in another 
direction, towards a fairer and more sustainable future. It resonates somewhat 
with recent research in i elds like urban studies, where there’s an interest in 
the opportunities that people have found in austerity and the localism agenda 
when it comes to town and community planning, new forms of co-production, 
and so on.
James: At one point it did almost look like this was going to be where the 
political battle over austerity would take place – on the terrain set out by the ‘Big 
1HZ)RUPDWLRQVLQGG 
WHAT IS AUSTERITY?     137
Society’ agenda, and around the question of what progressive or reactionary 
responses that could entail. There are interesting examples like Syriza running 
the ‘Solidarity for All’ campaign in Greece, setting up food banks, organising 
the collection and distribution of food and so on, and medical services and 
all sorts of things (obviously conditions are much, much worse than here), 
and doing it all in an explicitly political context. 
By contrast what we have ended up with here is a majority of food banks 
being run by religious institutions, who have in fact provided a strong critique 
of austerity in practice. If you look at what Church of England or Catholic 
Church has said about austerity of late, it has been quite politically sharp, in 
practice, and I think that is partly a result of the experience of trying to i ll 
in some of the gaps created by the contraction of the welfare state. But the 
difi culty in disentangling all this is just the embeddedness of the state in society 
in general. You know, it is there all the time and everybody uses it one way or 
another. The clean libertarian break that the Cameroonian wing of the Tory 
party appear to desire is not really possible. Perhaps it can work for some who 
are quite well off and send their kids to private schools anyway, and who use 
private hospitals, or whatever. They are free to talk about the ways in which 
we don’t really need the state and can provide services for ourselves. But it is 
everybody else who has to actually rely on the state. We’ve seen this with the 
attempt to get rid of child benei t (a universal benei t paid to all families with 
children) – it’s so embedded in people’s lives and their expectations of a good 
society that it’s been very difi cult for the government to undermine it, which 
I suspect is why they gave up on the ‘Big Society’ rhetoric. 
Rebecca: There’s a New Economics Foundation report – Responses to Austerity 
– that explores these questions as well. It looks at how local authorities and 
other groups and organisations in the UK have responded to austerity, which 
has often involved ‘creative’ adaptation of the kind that Kirsten writes about, 
at times with an eye to creating a more collaborative welfare state.
Jeremy: I think that in the long term that kind of response is always problematic, 
because the history of the undefended, underfunded, progressive reform 
of public services is not encouraging. A classic case in Britain is the ‘Care in 
the Community’ programme, whereby institutions for the care of the long-
term mentally ill and those with learning difi culties were closed, and an 
infrastructure of social care and support, enabling those people to live in the 
community, was promised. In practice the latter only ever half-materialised 
because to do it properly would have required massive investment, and the 
result was huge numbers of homeless and destitute people with mental health 
or learning issues by the end of the 1980s. 
The key point here is that ultimately, doing things in a participatory, 
democratic, devolved way that is actually functional, always ends up being more 
expensive than doing them in a centralised, top-down, vertical way. And if you 
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try to do the former on a shoe-string, then you end up with a hollowed out 
space, which gets i lled up or captured by capital, by private providers seeking 
rent and proi ts, very quickly. 
Rebecca: Yes that’s true.
James: There’s a very insidious part of this, and perhaps it’s becoming more 
apparent now with the majority Conservative government. Maybe it’s true 
that it’s George Osborne’s evil genius behind it all (he hasn’t read Marx, 
he’s not read Keynes, but I think he has read Gramsci), in the sense that he 
understands that you actually have a large number of people out there with 
a deep commitment to the State, and its provisions, and that if they want to 
embed neoliberalism, if they want to embed a certain way of working under 
these conditions, then they will have to undertake a very deliberate kind of 
chewing away, an undermining and hollowing-out strategy with regard to the 
welfare state. For example the version of devolution they are offering to the 
English regions is a version of local authority cuts on a grand scale – effectively 
offering region the power to determine the nature of their own cuts.
That is a break as well. Neoliberalism in Britain historically over the last 
thirty years has been something that central Government does, and it has 
treated local government as a site of likely resistance which needed to be 
smashed. What Osborne seems to be proposing now is that they we will get 
local government to deliver the next round of neoliberalism. 
Jeremy: That is interesting. Both Ken Spours of the Institute of Education, and 
Alan Finlayson have both commented to me in the past few months that they 
think that Osborne has got a hegemonic project underway, in a sense that both 
New Labour and, and Cameron, never really had. I’ve suggested many times 
that actually after the early, New Right phase of Thatcherism, neoliberalism 
in the UK never really had a classic project to persuade the masses of its 
legitimacy. Instead it basically offered high levels of private consumption in 
return for acquiescence to the hegemony of i nance capital. The deal was – 
we’ll undermine your social provision and your political democracy, but in 
return you’ll get cheap holidays and plasma-screen TVs. Whereas now their 
capacity to offer all that has been reduced, to the point where they are forced 
to try to win actual support for neoliberalism amongst a large public, which is 
in part what the whole austerity programme has been about. 
James: And much of this capacity to secure support through enabling 
consumption has very little to do with government policy. I mean, to the extent 
that we have free trade, it has much more to do with the expansion of low-cost 
manufacturing in China. Now, if your era of cheap plasma TV screens from 
China is coming to an end, then you have to do something else to maintain 
hegemony. And this is indeed something Thatcher and successive governments 
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were not able to do. They were never able to embed the idea that neoliberalism 
is a good thing. Support for redistribution of one form or another has remained 
consistent, which is quite incredible when you think about it, after decades of 
relentless propaganda: it’s almost as if there is something in the water that is 
a bit social democratic. So if you are a neoliberal government, what do you do 
under these circumstances? You probably start to do something which looks 
like what Osborne is doing.
Jeremy: I think that is true. It is a good way of reframing the whole notion 
of austerity as well. At the moment, I think we still don’t actually know if 
Osborne is seriously going to try to do this time round that he did not do, 
but threatened to do, during the last parliament: which is to implement a 
historically unprecedented contraction in state spending. [Guardian journalist] 
Polly Toynbee has a column in the Guardian today pointing out that, if he 
actually does what he says he’s going to do then, in i ve years’ time we will 
have a smaller state than anywhere in Europe, and smaller even than the US 
in terms of percentage of GDP. But that was the case six years ago, and most 
of the threatened austerity never actually materialised. So we don’t not know 
whether he is really going to do it. But it is very useful to understand the 
narrative and the rhetoric in this context, in the context of a need to create a 
new basis for long-term support for neoliberalism.
James: Yes.
Jeremy: In terms of the actual contraction of public spending effected by 
people like Thatcher. Ideological neoliberal always complained that she never 
really did it, but instead merely shifted spending from education and health, 
to the police and the military. But since 2010 it’s been notable that for the 
i rst time, as far as I know, a Conservative government has really gone for the 
police as well, as a site of major spending cuts. I fact I think that since 2010 
the police service has suffered the biggest single cut (30% across the board) 
of any major public service in British history. That is kind of extraordinary, in 
that it means that the contract between the neoliberal and the law and order 
state has been torn up in some sense. Which is pretty interesting, given that 
that close relationship between neoliberalism and the law and order state was 
crucial to the implementation of neoliberalism in the 1980s, and the Third 
Way governments never tried to cut spending on those areas signii cantly. 
James: Well it adds up to a very, very difi cult few years of manoeuvre that 
Osborne is trying to gear himself up to. It should – on paper – be very, very 
hard to get through. He needs to actually engineer a huge reduction in what 
people expect from the state – not just vulnerable demonised groups such as 
those who have really suffered since 2010 (in particular welfare claimants), 
but everybody. And he has to try to convince them that this is a good thing, 
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and that there will be very little that they can do to oppose it. Now, at the very 
least to make that work he needs an economy that is still growing, and in some 
sense still delivering, at least to a minimal degree. But it strikes me the only 
degree of l exibility there – and this is a huge issue, and the only thing that 
can make it all work – is a very elastic i nancial system that can, one way or 
the other, dole out lots and lots of debt. As long as you can keep doing that 
for the next few years, you can get through the next few years, implementing 
the next wave of neoliberalism.
Jeremy: So what is the future of austerity? 
James: I don’t know. The question is: will Osborne stick to his plans? That is 
the interesting question. The planned rate of reduction is certainly faster than 
we have got used to recently, but is already not as fast as originally suggested 
in 2010. But you know, Toynbee is right that if he implemented his plans, this 
would get us to a very small state in a very different society.
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